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Abstract
We study the implications of limited commitment on education and tax policies
chosen by benevolent governments. Individual wages are determined by both innate
abilities and education levels. Consistent with real world practices, the government
can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. Deviations from
full commitment tend to make education policies more progressive, increasing the
education subsidy for initially low skilled agents and decreasing it for initially high
skilled agents. We provide suggestive cross-country correlations for this mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Public finance economists have long recognized that the challenges involved in the design
of optimal education policies and income tax systems are intimately related. Income taxa-
tion influences the incentives to invest in education.1 Education subsidies and policies, in
turn, influence the choice of an optimal income tax system as they have a direct effect on
both the level and the distribution of wages. Many papers have studied the design of edu-
cation and tax policies jointly from a normative perspective – see, for example, Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005) for a state-of-the-art treatment in a heterogeneous agent model.2 This
strand of literature assumes that individuals rationally make human capital investment
decisions, reacting to incentives set by the tax code and education subsidies. Importantly,
the government fully commits to the income tax schedule that it announces before educa-
tion decisions are made.
Boadway et al. (1996) have drawn attention to the issue of time-consistency, in the spirit
of Kydland and Prescott (1977), inherent in the design of optimal tax and education poli-
cies. If the government lacks a device to credibly commit to tax policies at the time indi-
viduals make education decisions, this can dramatically depress the incentives of young
individuals to invest into human capital. In their framework, they show that this under-
investment arises and make a case for mandatory education as a second-best policy in the
presence of commitment problems.
This paper looks at the implications of limited commitment and policy credibility on
education and tax policies from a new perspective. Consistent with real world practices,
the government can decide to subsidize different levels of education at different rates.
The idea here is that governments typically intervene at primary, secondary and tertiary
education levels. However, as we will also exploit in our empirical section, the rate at
which these different education levels are subsidized is very different.3 We formalize
this by allowing the government to set a nonlinear schedule of education subsidies. The
income tax rate is linear and the revenue is redistributed lump-sum and used to finance
education subsidies. We derive our results in a transparent and simple heterogeneous
1See Abramitzky and Lavy (2012) for recent quasi-experimental evidence on the negative effect of re-
distributive taxation on education investment. More structural and model based approaches as the classic
work by Trostel (1993) also have found big effects of income taxation on human capital investment.
2See Richter (2009) for a recent treatment in a Ramsey setting with a representative agent. See Da Costa
and Maestri (2007) and Anderberg (2009) for a Mirrlees treatment with ex-ante homogeneous agents and
uncerainty.
3In fact, we will focus on two education levels in the theoretical analysis and think of primary educa-
tion as exogenous. In the empirical part we look at cross-country correlations on relative public education
expenditures on the tertiary level, relative to the primary and secondary level combined.
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agent model with two types (Stiglitz 1982). Consistent with empirical evidence, individual
wages are determined by both innate abilities and education levels.
We first consider the two polar cases where the government has full commitment to
stick to tax promises and no commitment at all. Under full commitment the optimal in-
come tax rate takes into account education incentives. The tax rate is smaller, when the
effect of education on wages is large relative to the effect of innate abilities on wages for
the initially high skilled. Intuitively, the more important the role of education for wages
the more important taxes become to incentivize high-skilled agents to self-select into high
education level. Education subsidies for the high types are set such that a first-best rule
for education is fulfilled: the subsidy corrects for the fiscal externality as in Bovenberg
and Jacobs (2005). For the low type, in addition to this correction of the fiscal externality,
education is downwards distorted at the margin to relax the incentive constraint of the
high type.
Without any commitment, no tax promise of the government is credible and individuals
rationally anticipate that the government re-optimizes after education is sunk. In line with
previous results, this leads to excessive taxation and depresses human capital investment.
An important result we find here concerns the design of education subsidies. We show
that they tend to become more progressive when there is a commitment problem. The
intuition is that a higher subsidy for low types and a lower subsidy for high types will
compress the distribution of education. As education inequality is reduced, also the wage
distribution in the next period is more compressed. And as wage inequality decreases, the
redistributive government sets a lower tax rate in the second period. This lower tax rate
will help to boost education incentives and helps to alleviate the commitment problem.
This is consistent with the recent results from Farhi et al. (2012) who first detected a similar
channel for nonlinear capital taxation.
We move on to study intermediate scenarios, where the government has some form of
limited commitment, nesting the two polar cases. More concretely, the government can
deviate from its announcements but this induces some output costs capturing the idea of a
reputational loss.4 The forward looking government wants to avoid costly deviation and
announces policies respectively. Labor income taxes are still designed to take into account
their effect on education incentives. However, the strength of the effect is decreasing the
more severe the commitment problem is because too low tax promises lack credibility.
Education policies become more progressive the more severe the commitment problem if
4Farhi et al. (2012) show how to microfound such an output loss in a dynamic repeated game, where
a deviation today brings a reputational cost borne in the future, because of depressed investment of future
generations.
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the government is sufficiently redistributive towards low types. Another way to look at
this result is to interpret the design of education and tax policies as a choice to engage
in redistribution ex-ante through more progressive education subsidies – which decreases
wage inequality – as opposed to engaging in redistribution ex-post through income taxa-
tion. With a lack of commitment, the government tries to weaken its own temptation to
engage in costly ex-post redistribution by increasing the amount of ex-ante redistribution.
We conclude by providing suggestive evidence for the described mechanisms in the
form of cross-country correlations. We proxy for commitment power using data from
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. Specifically, we use the variable
Government Effectiveness capturing “...the quality of policy formulation and implemen-
tation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” (Kaufmann
et al., 2010). Controlling for income, geographical variables and the overall share of gov-
ernment involvement in education, we find a robust correlation, indicating that countries
with higher policy credibility employ more regressive subsidies.
As already mentioned, this paper is related to Farhi et al. (2012), who consider capital
taxation without commitment. An important difference is that, in their framework, devi-
ation could imply full redistribution, i.e. 100% marginal tax rates on capital. In our case,
deviation is constrained to be less extreme as the government still has to respect labor
supply responses and therefore cannot fully tax away human capital returns. For sim-
plicity, we work with a two period model, as their pioneering work already proves the
equivalence in the results between the dynamic repeated game and the simple two period
version.
This paper also relates to the work on time inconsistency and education policies by
Konrad (2001) and Andersson and Konrad (2003).5 Konrad (2001) shows how the time
inconsistency problem is alleviated by the presence of private information in an optimal
taxation framework. In particular, he shows that the strong no-education result obtained
in Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand (1996) no longer applies, as with private informa-
tion some rents of education are still captured by individuals, preserving some incentives
to invest in education.6 In our framework, a similar logic applies as the government uses
a linear tax income rate together with lump-sum transfers, in the spirit of a simple nega-
tive income tax system. This also preserves some incentives to invest in education, even
in the complete absence of credible policy promises, as full equalization of incomes is
not feasible. In contrast to Konrad (2001), we consider ex-ante heterogeneous individu-
5In a related paper, Pereira (2009) studies linear education subsidies and shows that this subsidy offsets
some of the excessive redistribution from income taxes, when the government lacks commitment.
6Poutvaara (2003) shows that redistribution without commitment may still involve more education than
in the laissez-faire if the insurance effect of taxes is important.
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als and thereby address the progressivity of education subsidies. Lastly, Andersson and
Konrad (2003) investigate education policies chosen by extortionary governments lacking
commitment and how migration and tax competition affect policies.7
We depart from these papers by placing our focus on nonlinear education subsidies as
used in the real world.
In Section 2, we introduce the formal model and look at optimal income taxation with
exogenous education as a benchmark case. In Section 3, we derive optimal policies for the
full-commitment government before we look at the other extreme case where the govern-
ment cannot commit at all in Section 4. We then look at the intermediate case of partial
commitment in Section 5 before we present some suggestive empirical evidence in Section
6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 The Model Basics
In this section, we present the model basics and characterize optimal taxes with exogenous
education, an important benchmark which helps to understand the further results with
endogenous education.
2.1 Environment
We consider a two-period model, where ex-ante heterogeneous agents make an educa-
tional investment in the first period. In the second period, they make a labor leisure deci-
sion. More formally, there are two types of ex-ante heterogeneous agents. The θ1-type and
the θ2-type with θ2 > θ1. Their masses are f(θ1) and f(θ2) with f(θ1) + f(θ2) = 1 and θ is
assumed to be private information. In Period 1, they make a monetary educational invest-
ment e. The wage w they earn in period two is a function of innate type and education,
i.e. w(θ, e).
We impose three intuitive assumptions on the wage function w(θ, e). First, educa-
tion is productive and raises wages ∂w(θ,e)
∂e
> 0. Second education and innate ability are
complements implying higher marginal returns to education for the higher innate type:
∂w(θ2,e)
∂e
− ∂w(θ1,e)
∂e
> 0. Finally, innate abilities positively influence wages for a given level
of education: w(θ2, e)−w(θ1, e) > 0. None of these assumption are needed for most of the
7In a median voter framework, Poutvaara (2011) shows that generous subsidies for higher education
may make the median voter of the future a college graduate, leading to lower taxes compared to a world
with lower subsidies for high education. Relatedly, Poutvaara (2006) studies a median voter model with
voting on social security benefits and higher public education. He shows that in the case with multiple
equilibria, higher wage taxes are correlated with a higher provision of public education.
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results we derive in the sense that all formulas are valid if we deviate from those assump-
tions. These assumptions ease the understanding of the model, however, and have strong
empirical support. E.g., Card (1999) provides a comprehensive review of the literature
estimating the causal effect of education on earnings. Carneiro and Heckman (2005) and
Lemieux (2006), among others, document complementarity between innate skills and for-
mal education. Taber (2001) and Hendricks and Schoellman (2012) suggest that much of
the rise in the college premium may be attributed to a rise in the demand for unobserved
skills, which are predetermined and independent of education.
We assume quasi-linear preferences. To minimize the notational burden we often write
all the variables not as a function of θ but with subscript instead. E.g. e1 instead of e1(θ1)
or w2 instead of w(e2(θ2), θ2). The utility functions are U1 = c1 in period one and U2 =
c2−Ψ (h) in period two, where h are hours worked. For simplicity, we assume that Ψ(h) =
h1+
1
ε
1+ 1
ε
, i.e. that Ψ exhibits a constant elasticity of labor supply ε. Before tax income is
denoted by yi = wihi. Further we assume no discounting and a zero interest rate for
notational convenience.
We are considering redistributive linear taxation. That is, we are interested in the poli-
cies of a government that is interested in redistributing from the high type θ2 to the low
type θ1 via linear taxes used to finance a lump-sum rebate such as in a negative income
tax system. To capture this redistributive concern, we set the Pareto weights f˜(θ1) and
f˜(θ2) such that
f˜(θ1)
f(θ1)
> f˜(θ2)
f(θ2)
. When deciding about the optimal degree of redistribution,
the government has to take into account that taxes will (i) lower incentives to work and
also (ii) lower incentives to invest in education. The education margin, however, can also
be influenced by nonlinear education subsidies. Before looking at optimal policies in the
different commitment scenarios, we look at the simple benchmark case of exogenous ed-
ucation where commitment issues do not arise.
2.2 Optimal Policies with Exogenous Education
Assume a one period setting where education levels e1 and e2 are exogenous. In that
case, the only relevant margin for the government when choosing taxes is the labor-leisure
margin. The problem of the government then simply is
6
max
t
f˜(θ1)
(
(1− t)w1h(t, w1) + T −Ψ[h(t, w1)]
)
+f˜(θ2)
(
(1− t)w2h(t, w2) + T −Ψ[h(t, w2)]
)
(1)
subject to a government budget constraint
T = t
(
f(θ1)w1h(t, w1) + (1− f(θ1))w2h(t, w2)
)
(2)
and optimal labor supply of the individuals
h(t, wi) = arg max
h
(1− t)hwi −Ψ(h).
The government thus only has to choose t optimally and thereby take into account how
the transfer T is determined by the government budget constraint (2) and how individu-
als’ hours worked h respond.8 It is then easy to show that the optimal linear tax rate tex,
in this case with exogenous human capital, satisfies
tex
1− tex =
(
f˜(θ1)− f(θ1)
)(
y2−y1
y¯
)
ε
, (3)
where y¯ is average income f(θ1)y1 + f(θ2)y2. The optimal tax rate is increasing in re-
distributive preferences
(
f˜(θ1)− f(θ1)
)
, increasing in inequality measured by y2−y1
y¯
and
decreasing in the elasticity of labor supply. The formula (3) is a variation for the opti-
mal linear tax rate of Sheshinski (1972).9 We refrain from providing a formal proof for
this simple case as it is nested in the following formulas with endogenous educational
attainment.
8In addition, one must also respect a non-negativity constraint on consumption that might be binding
for some “extreme” Pareto weights. In the following we assume that the Pareto weights which we are
considering will never be that “extreme”.
9See Stantcheva (2013) for a similar formula in a discrete type setting.
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3 Optimal Policies with Full Commitment
3.1 The Government’s Problem
We now consider the case where the educational decision is endogenous and the gov-
ernment can influence the decision of the agents by setting a nonlinear subsidy schedule.
Thus, the government chooses a (nonlinear) subsidy function S(e) and an income tax rate
t10 subject to a government budget constraint and subject to behavioral responses of the
individuals. Thus, formally we have:
max
t,S(·)
f˜(θ1)
(
(1− t)w1h(t, w1) + T −Ψ[h(t, w1)]− e1 + S(e1)
)
+f˜(θ2)
(
(1− t)w2h(t, w2) + T −Ψ[h(t, w2)]− e1 + S(e2)
)
(4)
subject to a government budget constraint
T = t
(
f1w(e1, θ1)h(t, w1) + f2w2h(t, w2)− f1S(e1)− f2S(e2)
)
and optimal individual behaviour
∀ i = 1, 2 : (ei, hi) = arg max
e,h
(1− t)w(e, θi)h+ T −Ψ(h)− e+ S(e). (5)
This problem has some similarities to the problem in Stiglitz (1982), where a nonlinear
tax schedule is chosen in an economy with two groups of individuals. By the revelation
principle we can formulate the part of choosing S(·) as choosing e1, e2, c11, c12 directly, where
c11 and c12 denote first period consumption.11 In that case, we can replace (5) by
h(t, wi) = arg max
h
(1− t)hwi −Ψ(h) (6)
10As individuals already reveal their type with their education decision, the government could actually
also levy individualized lump sum taxes in period 2 as argued by Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand (1996).
In the spirit of the Ramsey approach, we constrain the labor income taxes to be linear, however. Alternatively,
we could overcome this kind of informational inconsistency by assuming uncertainty in education returns
as Konrad (2001). We choose the case with certainty and constrained linear taxes, however, because the
exposition becomes particularly clear and the result about the relation between commitment power and
progressivity of education subsidies is more transparent.
11With linear utility, the timing of consumption across the first and the second period is not determined.
This implies that there are alternative ways to state the problem. E.g., we dropped first period consumption
in problem (4) without loss of generality.
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and an incentive compatibility constraint12
c12 + (1− t)w2h(t, w2)−Ψ(h(t, w2))
≥c11 + (1− t)w(e1, θ2)h(t, w(e1, θ2))−Ψ(h(t, w(e1, θ2))). (7)
Notice that in the incentive constraint (7) the deviation utility on the right-hand-side, the
terms w(e1, θ2) and h(t, w(e1, θ2)), show up. A deviating high-skilled agent receives the
education level of the low skilled agent e1. The wage she receives differs from the wage
of the low skilled agent because of the effect of innate abilities on wages. To keep notation
simple we will call this w(e1, θ2) = wc, with a c for counterfactual as in equilibrium by
incentive compatibility the wage will never be observed. We call the associated hour
choice h(t, w(e1θ2)) = hc and associated income yc = hcwc.
The government’s problem now reads as:
max
c11,c
1
2,t,e1,e2
f˜(θ1)
(
c11 + (1− t)w1h(t, w1) + T −Ψ[h(t, w1)]
)
+f˜(θ2)
(
c12 + (1− t)w2h(t, w2) + T −Ψ[h(t, w2)]
)
(8)
subject to a government budget constraint
T = t
(
f1w1h(t, w1) + f2w2h(t, w2)− f1(c11 + e1)− f2(c12 + e2)
)
, (9)
and subject to (6) and (7), where we denote as η the Lagrangian multiplier of the incen-
tive compatibility constraint. The Lagrangian and the first-order conditions are stated in
Appendix A.
The solution (8) can then be implemented with a nonlinear subsidy function S(·) that
has to yield the desired consumption levels, i.e. S(e1) = c11 + e1 and S(e2) = c12 + e2. In
addition, we have to make sure that incentives for the level of education and labor supply
are jointly optimal for the individual. This implies that – given the subsidy function –
(5) has to hold. Naturally, infinitely many nonlinear subsidy schedules can implement
the desired allocation, as in the nonlinear tax problem with two types of Stiglitz (1982).
We will in the following be interested in those subsidy functions that are differentiable
12Since we assume f˜(θ1) > f(θ1), we focus on downward redistributive taxation where only the incentive
constraint of the θ2-type is binding.
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at e1 and e2. In these cases, we know that the first-order condition for education of an
individual can be rearranged as:
(1− S ′(e(θi))) = (1− t)∂wi
∂e
hi ∀ i = 1, 2.
In the following, we will therefore be interested in
s(θi) ≡ 1− (1− t)∂wi
∂e
hi ∀ i = 1, 2.
Having computed an optimal allocation, we can therefore infer the implicit marginal ed-
ucation subsidies s(θ1) and s(θ2) for this allocation. For simplicity, we will call s(θ1) and
s(θ2) education subsidies in the remainder of this paper.13 Note also that throughout this
paper, we only characterize marginal subsidies and not average subsidies.
3.2 Optimal Tax and Education Policies
We start by characterizing the optimal linear income tax rate. As the following propo-
sition shows, the optimal linear tax rate is corrected by the endogeneity of education as
compared to the optimal tax rate with exogenous education in equation (3).
Proposition 1. In a full-commitment economy, the optimal linear tax rate satisfies
tf
1− tf =
(f˜(θ1)− f(θ1))
(
y2−y1
y¯
)
− η
(
y2−yc2
y¯
)

,
where the multiplier satisfies η = f˜(θ1)− f(θ1).
Proof. See Appendix A.1
The tax rate with endogenous education decisions is still increasing in income inequal-
ity and decreasing in the labor supply elasticity. As can be seen, there is an additional
force given by η
(
y2−yc2
y¯
)
in the numerator as compared to the case where education is
taken as exogenous. It decreases the optimal tax rate, and the effect is stronger the bigger
the difference y2 − yc2. yc2 is the income level that the high type θ2 would attain when only
taking the education level of the low type e1. The difference, hence, captures the effect of a
higher education level for the high type on her earnings. The more important the effect of
13As is in the optimal taxation problem with discrete types, we can always pick a nonlinear subsidy
schedule such that the first-order conditions of an individuals are also sufficient and her problem is con-
cave. In order to ensure that locally linear subsidy schedules implement the desired allocation, further
assumptions on w(θ, e) have to be made, see, e.g., Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005, p.2010) for a discussion of
that in a similar framework.
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education on earnings, the smaller the tax rate tends to be. Consider the one extreme case,
where additional education does not change wages at all for the high-type, so y2 = yc2. In
this case, there is no need for the optimal tax rate to take into account education incen-
tives, and the formula collapses to the case with exogenous human capital. In the other
extreme case, we would have y1 = yc2, so with the same education level both agents would
receive the same wage. This would essentially eliminate agent heterogeneity and the op-
timal tax rate would be zero in a model without risk. The following corollary summarizes
the above reasoning.
Corollary 2. Let e∗1 and e∗2 be the solution to the problem (8). Then the respective optimal linear
tax rate is smaller than the linear tax rate as defined by (3) for e1 = e∗1 and e2 = e∗2, i.e. tf (e∗1, e∗2) <
tex(e∗1, e
∗
2).
Income taxes are not the only instrument of the government. Governments do rely on
education subsidies to increase the incentives to invest into education.
We now characterize optimal education subsidies.
Proposition 3. In a full-commitment economy, education subsidies satisfy
sf (θ1) = t
f ∂w1
∂e1
h1(1 + )− η
f(θ1)
(1− tf )
[
hc2
∂wc2
∂e1
− h1∂w1
∂e1
]
and
sf (θ2) = t
f ∂w2
∂e2
h2(1 + ).
Proof. See Appendix A.2
First, looking at the education subsidy for the low type one can see that there are two
parts. The first term reflects the fiscal externality effect of private education decisions
(Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005): the education decision of individuals imposes an exter-
nality on the government budget as individuals with higher education pay higher taxes.
The government internalizes this fiscal externality by subsidizing education in a Pigou-
vian way. As the formula reveals, the larger the labor supply elasticity is, the larger the
subsidy. Intuitively, the stronger individuals’ working hours react to wage increases, the
larger is the fiscal externality on the government budget. Relatedly, the subsidy increases
in the marginal return of education ∂w1
∂e1
and in the income tax rate.
The second term captures the fact that innate abilities and education are complements.
The marginal return to education is increasing in innate ability. As the government is re-
distributive, there is a force towards lowering education subsidies, as they tend to profit
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more the initially high types. Maldonado (2008) first has shown that in case of a comple-
mentarity between educational investment and innate ability, education should be taxed.
See also Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011) for a discussion if this issue.14 For the high type
θ2 only the fiscal externality part is present because a standard “no-distortion-at-the-top”
result applies for the second part.
4 Optimal Policies without Commitment
We now characterize policies when the government has no commitment power and con-
trast them to the full-commitment results. We start backwards, looking at optimal tax
policies, once education decisions are sunk.
4.1 The Problem in Period Two
The problem of the planner is basically equivalent to that of the planner in Section 2.2,
as the distribution of wages is taken as exogenous. In particular, the same tax formula
applies:
tnc
1− tnc =
(
f˜(θ1)− f(θ1)
)(
y2−y1
y¯
)
ε
. (10)
In the following, we write the optimal tax rate for the second period planner as a function
of both education levels, so tnc(e1, e2).
14Maldonado (2008) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2011) also consider the case where educational returns
are decreasing in ability and show that in this case, education should rather be subsidized (relative to a
first-best rule). In line with empirical evidence, we focus on the case of educational returns that are in-
creasing in innate ability (Carneiro and Heckman 2005, Lemieux 2006). Our results concerning the relation
between commitment power and the progressivity of education subsidies is not affected by this assumption,
however.
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4.2 The Problem in Period One
In the first period, the planner anticipates that he will set taxes according to (10). There-
fore, in the first period, the problem reads as:
max
c1,c2,e1,e2
= f˜(θ1)
(
c11 + (1− tnc(e1, e2))w1h1(tnc(e1, e2), w1)
+ T −Ψ[h1(tnc(e1, e2), w1)]
)
+ f˜(θ2)
(
c12 + (1− tnc(e1, e2))w2h2(tnc(e1, e2), w2)
+ T −Ψ[h2(tnc(e1, e2), w2)]
)
subject to the government budget constraint
T = tnc(e1, e2)
(
f(θ1)w1h1(t
nc(e1, e2), w1)
+ (1− f(θ1))w2h2(tnc(e1, e2), w2)
− f(θ1)c11 − f(θ2)c12 − f(θ2)e2 − f(θ1)e1
)
(11)
and the incentive constraint
c12 + (1− tnc(e1, e2))w2h2 −Ψ(h2) ≥ c11 + (1− tnc(e1, e2))wc2hc2 −Ψ(hc2).
This problem is very similar to the problem in Section 3. The difference is that the gov-
ernment cannot choose t but instead takes into account how it will choose t in the future
once education decisions are sunk. The Lagrangian and first-order conditions are stated in
Appendix B. The following proposition shows how optimal optimal education subsidies
are designed in a no-commitment economy.
Proposition 4. In a no-commitment economy, education subsidies satisfy
snc(θ1) = t
nc∂w1
∂e1
h1(1 + )− η
f(θ1)
∂tnc
∂e1
(y2 − yc2)
and
snc(θ2) = t
nc∂w2
∂e2
h2(1 + )− η
f(θ1)
∂tnc
∂e2
(y2 − yc2)
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where ∂t
nc
∂e1
< 0 and ∂t
nc
∂e2
> 0 and the multiplier satisfies η = f˜(θ1)− f(θ1).
Proof. See Appendix B.1
In comparison to the full-commitment case in Proposition 3, there is now an additional
term in both formulas for the optimal education subsidy. In fact, for the low type, this
additional term favors higher subsidies and for the high type, this additional term favors
lower subsidies. Together this tends to make education policies more progressive.
The intuition behind this result is clear and simple. In the case of the low type the
additional term is given by:
− η
f(θ1)
∂tnc
∂e1
(y2 − yc2) > 0.
A higher education subsidy and a higher level of education for the low type will decrease
the optimal tax rate chosen by the government in period two ∂t
nc
∂e1
< 0. This will strengthen
education incentives for both types. In other words, the government anticipates its temp-
tation to set too high taxes in the second period. By compressing the distribution of educa-
tion across the two agents, it can avoid some of the harmful spillover from too high taxes
on the education margin. Consistent with that argument, there is a downward adjustment
in the optimal subsidy for the high type
− η
f(θ1)
∂tnc
∂e2
(y2 − yc2) < 0,
as a higher education level for the high type will tend to increase taxes because of higher
income inequality.
5 Varying the Degree of Commitment
In the previous section we studied two polar cases. We now look at economies, where the
degree of commitment power of the government is allowed to differ, nesting the two cases
from the previous sections. This allows us to show that smoother versions of our previous
results hold.
5.1 Costs of Deviating and the Commitment Technology
Following Farhi, Sleet, Werning, and Yeltekin (2012), we introduce output costs of devi-
ation. This implies that the government lacks commitment and can always deviate from
its announced tax rate. However, deviation will incur some output loss κ, which can be
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considered as a reduced form for a reputational loss. Farhi, Sleet, Werning, and Yeltekin
(2012) show how to microfound such an output loss in a dynamic repeated game, where
a deviation today brings a reputational cost borne in the future because of depressed in-
vestment of future generations.
Formally, this implies an additional credibility constraint on the government problem.
It takes the form:
W2PC(e1, e2, t) ≥ W2Dev(e1, e2)− κ, (12)
where W2PC(e1, e2, t) is second period welfare as a function of education levels for both
types and the promised tax rate t, under the assumption that the government sticks to its
promise.W2Dev(e1, e2) on the other is the second period welfare obtained if the government
reneges on its tax promise and effectively takes the education levels as exogenous as in
Section 2.2.
This form of deviation costs allows to flexibly capture different levels of limited com-
mitment. At the one extreme end, when κ is zero, there is no way for the government to
credibly commit and we arrive at the case from Section 4. At the other extreme end, when
κ is above some positive threshold κ¯ > 0, all tax promises are fully credible and we arrive
at the full-commitment solution of Section 3, which naturally achieves the highest welfare.
In this section we focus on the intermediate cases where κ lies between zero and κ¯.
5.2 Optimal Policies and Discussion
In comparison to the full-commitment problem in Section 3, the government has to re-
spect the credibility constraint (12) in addition to all other constraints. We denote the
Lagrangian multiplier on this credibility constraint as ζ . The Lagrangian function and
the first-order conditions are stated in Appendix C. The following proposition shows the
optimal income tax rate for this case.
Proposition 5. In a partial-commitment economy, the optimal linear tax rate satisfies:
tpc
1− tpc =
(f˜(θ1)− f(θ1))
(
y2−y1
y¯
)
− η
1+ζ
(
y2−yc2
y¯
)

,
Proof. See Appendix C.1
One can see how this case nests the full-commitment case, i.e. the optimal income tax
rate from Proposition 1. If the credibility constraint is not binding for sufficiently high
κ (hence κ > κ¯), ζ is equal to zero and the government is able to implement the full-
commitment tax rate. As discussed above, the second term in the numerator reflects how
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labor taxes are adjusted to provide education incentives and complement education sub-
sidies. This effect is now scaled down by 1
1+ζ
. The more severe the commitment problem,
the bigger ζ tends to be. This will make any tax promises less credible and, anticipating
this, the government will set a higher, more credible tax rate. Next, we characterize the
resulting education subsidies.
Proposition 6. In a partial-commitment economy, education subsidies satisfy:
spc(θ1) = t
pc∂w1
∂e1
h1(1 + )− η
f(θ1)
(1− tpc)
[
hc2
∂wc2
∂e1
− h1∂w1
∂e1
]
+
ζ
f(θ1)
(
∂WPC
∂e1
− ∂WDev
∂e1
)
where ∂WPC
∂e1
− ∂WDev
∂e1
> 0 and
spc(θ2) = t
pc∂w2
∂e2
h2(1 + ) +
ζ
f(θ2)
(
∂WPC
∂e2
− ∂WDev
∂e2
)
.
where ∂WPC
∂e2
− ∂WDev
∂e2
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.2
Whenever the credibility constraint is binding, the subsidies get adjusted by
ζ
f(θ1)
(
∂W2PC
∂e1
− ∂W
2
Dev
∂e1
)
> 0
and
ζ
f(θ2)
(
∂W2PC
∂e2
− ∂W
2
Dev
∂e2
)
< 0
respectively. This implies that whenever there is a commitment problem, the marginal
value of low level education goes up as it strengthens the credibility of tax promises. Re-
latedly, the marginal value of high level education goes down as it increases the tempta-
tion to renege on tax promises and increase the tax rate to redistribute. Taken together, a
more compressed education distribution leads to a more compressed wage distribution,
decreasing the value of an ex-ante harmful deviation of the government. With limited
commitment, the government wants to avoid excessive ex-post redistribution, by engag-
ing already in ex-ante redistribution through the use of education policies. The larger the
commitment problem, the larger ζ and the stronger this effect on the progressivity of ed-
ucation subsidies. In the next subsection, we illustrate with a numerical example how a
decrease in κ leads to more progressive education subsidies.
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Figure 1: Regressivity of Education Subsidies
5.3 Numerical Illustration
We assume an equal mass of high and low types f(θ1) = f(θ2) = 0.5 and set the welfare
weights to f˜(θ1) = 0.9 and f˜(θ2) = 0.1. We set the labor supply elasticity to 0.25. For
wages, we assume that they are determined by a simple Cobb Douglas production func-
tion wi = θ0.5i e0.5i with equal weights. There is a constant marginal cost of education. We
start by assuming that the government has limited commitment power and the cost of
reneging on tax promises (κ) is set at 5% of output calculated from the full-commitment
economy.
The equilibrium tax rate in the partial-commitment case is tpc = 35.56%. For compar-
ison it is tfc = 19.56% in the full-commitment case. This illustrates the workings of the
formula in Proposition 5, as the human capital effect on taxes is scaled down relative to
the full-commitment benchmark, because the government lacks full credibility. A deviat-
ing government which would take the wage distribution as exogenously given (Section
2.2) would set a tax rate of 65.95%. Thus, although the government lacks commitment
power, it still takes human capital investment incentives into account as it sets a signifi-
cantly smaller tax rate (about 30 percentage points).
The main predictions from our analysis of education subsides concern the degree of
the progressivity of education subsidies, see Proposition 6. In line with these predictions
we find that the ratio of the subsidies s
pc(θ2)
spc(θ1)
of the high relative to the low type is 0.99,
as compared to 2.38 in the full-commitment case. A higher s
pc(θ2)
spc(θ1)
ratio implies a more
regressive incidence of subsidies.
Finally, we illustrate how the regressivity of education policies varies with the commit-
ment technology. Figure 1 plots s
pc(θ2)
spc(θ1)
against κ as it varies, measured in percentage points
of output lost when reneging on tax promises. Moving from left to right, the commitment
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power of the government gradually increases. In line with the mechanism outlined above,
a government with more commitment power can afford to set less progressive subsidies
as its credibility increases.
6 Empirical Implications
The model predicts a more regressive incidence of subsidies when the ability of a govern-
ment to commit is high. We now provide suggestive cross-country evidence for this. The
estimates of this section should be interpreted as correlations only.
Data. As a measure for commitment power and the credibility of policy announcements
we use data from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database. We use
the variable Government Effectiveness capturing “...the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.”
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). To proxy for the regressivity/progressivity of public education
subsidies, we use the share of public education expenditures at each educational level
relative to total public education expenditures. We then take the share spent on tertiary
education relative to the total spending share on all lower levels of education (primary
and secondary). The bigger the value of this variable, the more regressive is the incidence
of public education expenditure, in the sense that more is spent on tertiary education rel-
ative to lower tier education. To construct the measure, we take data from the UNESCO
on public educational expenditures across education levels. We also use GDP data, which
we take from the World Bank database. We use the year 2008 as the most recent year with
a reasonable number of observations. We are left with a sample of 54 countries, for which
all the relevant data is available.
Results. For Figure 2, we regress our measure of the regressivity of public education
on the government credibility index. The figure is an added-variable plot so that the re-
gressively index is de-meaned. The correlation is positive and highly significant.15 The
coefficient in column one of Table 1 implies that a one standard deviation increase in pol-
icy credibility increases the regressivity of public education expenditures by 0.53 standard
deviations. Next, we include continent dummies. Only exploiting the variation within
continents increases the credibility coefficient. Adding the log of per capita GDP does not
15It is even stronger when excluding Lesotho and Cuba, which are two outliers with high regressivity but
weak institutional commitment. On the other side, Singapore is an outlier with very strong policy credibility
and a high incidence of regressivity.
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Figure 2: Government Education Expenditures and Policy Credibility
Correlation between regressivity in education expenditures, as proxy for subsidies, and government credibility. Corresponds to
estimates from first column in Table 1. Since regressions include an intercept, the regressivtiy index on the Y-axis is measured relative
to the cross-sectional sample mean.
Table 1: Credibility of Government and Education Regressivity
Dependent variable: Regressivity of Education Expenditure
Policy Credibility 0.759*** 1.223*** 1.329** 1.160**
(0.169) (0.332) (0.550) (0.560)
Log GDP - 0.020 - 0.021
(0.030) (0.032)
Total Education 0.031**
Expenditure Share (0.013)
Continent Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.290 0.352 0.356 0.490
Observations: 54. Year: 2008. List of countries see Appendix. Policy Credibility coefficient multiplied by
10. Robust errors. Last column based on 52 observation, since data on Bhutan and Uganda is missing.
affect the conclusion. Maybe surprisingly, income per capita seems not to be correlated
with a more regressive incidence of public expenditure, as is seen in column three. The
raw correlation between GDP per capita and our regressivity index is, however, positive
and significant (0.49). But as the estimates indicate, this effect vanishes with continent
dummies and controlling for government credibility. Finally, we control for the overall
share of public education expenditures aggregated across all levels as a fraction of GDP.
This approximates for the overall importance of the public sector in providing and paying
for education. The main correlation concerning the effect of governmental policy credibil-
19
ity remains unaffected. As column four shows, countries in which the government has a
relatively larger stake in education, tend to spend more on higher education.
7 Conclusion
Optimal income tax and education policies depend on the degree of commitment power
or policy credibility the government has. We build a transparent and simple heteroge-
neous agent model to understand the economic mechanisms involved. Individual wages
are determined by both innate abilities and education levels. Without any commitment,
the labor income tax does not take into account the incentives to acquire education. When
some or full commitment is available, income tax rates are adjusted to incentivize edu-
cation. The tax rate is smaller, when the effect of education on wages is large relative to
the effect of innate abilities on wages for the initially high skilled. We allow the govern-
ment to subsidize different levels of education at different rates. The main implication
of limited commitment is that education policies become more progressive relative to the
full-commitment benchmark: the government takes into account that a more compressed
wage distribution limits its own temptation to tax excessively. By adjusting the distribu-
tion of education, the government effectively creates its own commitment device. This
mirrors previous findings from Farhi, Sleet, Werning, and Yeltekin (2012) concerning the
design of capital taxes. Using data on the credibility of policy announcements from the
World Bank database, we find a positive and significant correlation between the degree
of commitment power and how regressive education expenditures are across countries,
consistent with the mechanism highlighted in this paper. This correlation is conditional
on income and geographical controls.
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A The Full-Commitment Planner
We first substitute the government budget constraint into the problem. The Lagrangian
function then reads as
L =f˜(θ1)
(
c11 + (1− t)w(e1, θ1)h(t, w1)−Ψ[h(t, w1)]
)
+ f˜(θ2)
(
c12 + (1− t)w2(e2, θ2)h(t, w2)−Ψ[h(t, w2)]
)
+ t
(
f1w(e1, θ1)h(t, w1) + (1− f1)w(e2, θ2)h(t, w2)− f1(c11 + e1)− f2(c12 + e2)
)
+ η
(
c12 + (1− t)w2h(t, w2)−Ψ(h(t, w2))− c11 + (1− t)yc −Ψ(hc)
)
The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂c11
= f˜1 − f1 − η = 0
∂L
∂c12
= f˜2 − f2 + η = 0
∂L
∂t
=− f˜(θ1)y1 − (1− f˜(θ1))y2 + f(θ1)y1 + (1− f(θ1))y2 + tf(θ1)w1∂h1
∂t
+ t(1− f(θ1))w2∂h2
∂t
− η(w2h2 − wc2hc2) = 0 (13)
∂L
∂e1
= f˜(θ1)(1− t)∂w1
∂e
h1 + tf(θ1)
∂w1
∂e1
h1(1 + )− f(θ1) + η
[
−(1− t)hc2
∂wc2
∂e1
]
= 0,
∂L
∂e2
= f˜(θ2)(1− t)∂w2
∂e
h2 + tf(θ2)
∂w2
∂e2
h2(1 + )− f(θ2) + η(1− t)∂w2
∂e
h2 = 0.
From the FOC for c11, one directly obtains η = f˜1(θ)− f1(θ).
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Two manipulations of (13) yield
(
f˜1 − f1
)
(y2 − y1)− t
1− t
(
f1w1h1
∂h1
∂1− t
1− t
h1
+ f2w2h2
∂h2
∂1− t
1− t
h2
)
− η(yc − y1).
Now use ε = ∂h2
∂1−t
1−t
h2
= ∂h1
∂1−t
1−t
h1
and y¯ = f1y1 + f2y2 and solve for t1−t to obtain the result.
A.2 Proposition 3
We start with the θ2 type. Rewriting the FOC for e2 yields
f˜(θ2)(1− t)∂w2
∂e
h2 + tf(θ2)
∂w2
∂e2
h2(1 + )− f(θ2) +
(
f2 − f˜2
)
(1− t)∂w2
∂e
h2 = 0,
which yields
tf(θ2)
∂w2
∂e2
h2(1 + )− f(θ2) + f2(1− t)∂w2
∂e
h2 = 0.
This can be rewritten as
f2(1− t)∂w2
∂e
h2 = 1− t∂w2
∂e2
h2(1 + ),
where the RHS is the definition of the implicit education subsidy for the θ2-type.
Now we look at the θ1-type. Rewriting the FOC for e1 yields:
f˜(θ1)(1− t)∂w1
∂e
h1 + tf(θ1)
∂w1
∂e1
h1(1 + )− f(θ1) + η
[
−(1− t)hc2
∂wc2
∂e1
]
+ η(1− t)h1∂w1
∂e1
− η(1− t)h1∂w1
∂e1
= 0.
Now use η = f˜1 − f1 and obtain
tf(θ1)
∂w1
∂e1
h1(1 + )− f(θ1) + η(1− t)
[
h1
∂w1
∂e1
− hc2
∂wc2
∂e1
]
− f1(1− t)h1∂w1
∂e1
= 0.
Rearranging and again using the definition of the implicit subsidy yields the result.
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B The No-Commitment Planner
We first substitute the government budget constraint into the problem. The Lagrangian
function then reads as
L =f˜(θ1)
(
c11 + (1− tnc(e1, e2))w1(e1, θ1)h1(tnc(e1, e2), w1)−Ψ[h1(tnc(e1, e2), w1)]
)
+ f˜(θ2)
(
c12 + (1− tnc(e1, e2))w2(e2, θ2)h2(tnc(e1, e2), w2)−Ψ[h2(tnc(e1, e2), w2)]
)
+ tnc(e1, e2)
(
f(θ1)w1(e1, θ1)h1(t
nc(e1, e2), w1)
+ (1− f(θ1))w2(e2, θ2)h2(tnc(e1, e2), w2)− f(θ1)c11 − f(θ2)c12 − f(θ2)e2 − f(θ1)e1
)
+ η
(
c12 + (1− tnc(e1, e2))w2h2 −Ψ(h2)− c11 + (1− tnc(e1, e2))wc2hc2 −Ψ(hc2)
)
For the first-order condition for e1 and e2, we know that their impact on Period 2 welfare
via t is zero due to the envelope theorem. Thus the first-order conditions read as:
∂L
∂e1
= f˜(θ1)(1−t)∂w1
∂e
h1+tf(θ1)
∂w1
∂e1
h1(1+)−f(θ1)+η
[
−(1− tF )hc2
∂wc2
∂e1
]
−η ∂t
∂e1
[w2h2 − wcchc2] = 0,
∂L
∂e2
= f˜(θ2)(1−t)∂w2
∂e
h2+tf(θ2)
∂w2
∂e2
h2(1+)−f(θ2)+η(1−t)∂w2
∂e
h2−η ∂t
∂e2
[w2h2 − wcchc2] = 0.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4
The optimal education subsidies can be obtained by some analytical manipulations almost
equivalently as in Appendix A.2.
We now look at the derivatives of t with respect to e1 and e2. We know that:
t
1− t =
(f˜(θ1)− f(θ1))
[
w2h2−w1h1
wh
]

.
We now show that t is increasing in e2 and decreasing in e1. Define the implicit function:
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F (e1, e2, t(e1, e2)) =
t
1− t −
(f˜(θ1)− f(θ1))
[
w2h2−w1h1
wh
]

= 0.
As F = 0 for any (e1, e2), the derivatives of F w.r.t to e1 and e2 have to be zero as well. In
general these derivates are characterized by
∂F
∂t
∂t
∂ei
+
∂F
∂ei
= 0
and therefore can reveal the sign of ∂t
∂ei
. Spelling this out for e1 yields
∂t
∂e1
[
1
(1− t)2 −
(f˜(θ1)− f(θ1))
y2
((
∂y2
∂t
− ∂y1
∂t
)
y +
(
f(θ1)
∂y1
∂t
+ f(θ2)
∂y2
∂t
)
(y2 − y1)
)]
+
(f˜(θ1)− f(θ1))
y2
∂y1
∂e1
((y2 − y1)f(θ1) + y¯) = 0
and hence
∂t
∂e1
 1(1− t)2 − (f˜(θ1)− f(θ1))y2
((
∂y2
∂t
− ∂y1
∂t
)
y +
(
f(θ1)
∂y1
∂t
+ f(θ2)
∂y2
∂t
)
(y2 − y1)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡X

+
(f˜(θ1)− f(θ1))
y2
∂y1
∂e1
y2 = 0.
For X we obtain:(
∂y2
∂t
− ∂y1
∂t
)
y −
(
f(θ1)
∂y1
∂t
+ f(θ2)
∂y2
∂t
)
(y2 − y1)
=
∂y1
∂t
(−f(θ1)y1 − (1− f(θ1))y2 − f(θ1)y2 + f(θ1)y1) + ∂y2
∂t
(f(θ1)y1
+ (1− f(θ1))y2 − (1− f(θ1))y2 + (1− f(θ1))y1))
=
∂y1
∂t
(−y2) + ∂y2
∂t
y1 =
∂y1
∂1− ty2 −
∂y2
∂1− ty1 = ε
y1y2
1− t − ε
y1y2
1− t = 0,
so it follows ∂t
∂e1
< 0. Similar reasoning shows ∂t
∂e2
> 0.
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C The Partial-Commitment Planner
We first substitute the government budget constraint into the problem. The Lagrangian
function then reads as
L =f˜(θ1)
(
c11 + (1− t)w(e1, θ1)h(t, w1)−Ψ[h(t, w1)]
)
+ f˜(θ2)
(
c12 + (1− t)w2(e2, θ2)h(t, w2)−Ψ[h(t, w2)]
)
+ t
(
f1w(e1, θ1)h(t, w1) + (1− f1)w(e2, θ2)h(t, w2)− f1(c11 + e1)− f2(c12 + e2)
)
+ η
(
c12 + (1− t)w2h(t, w2)−Ψ(h(t, w2))− c11 + (1− t)yc −Ψ(hc)
)
+ ζ
(W2PC(e1, e2, t)−W2Dev(e1, e2) + κ, )
where
f˜1(1− t)w1h1 −Ψ(h1) + f˜2(1− t)w2h2−(
f˜1(1− td)w1h1(w1, td)−Ψ(h1(w1, td)) + f˜2(1− t)w2h2(w2, td)
)
+ t (w1h1f1 + w2h2f2)− td
(
w1h1(w1, t
d)f1 + w2h2(w2, t
d)f2
)
.
For c1 and c2 we get the same FOC as in the full-commitment case. For t we get:
∂L
∂t
=(1 + ζ)
(
− f˜(θ1)y1 − (1− f˜(θ1))y2 + f(θ1)y1 + (1− f(θ1))y2 + tf(θ1)w1∂h1
∂t
+ t(1− f(θ1))w2∂h2
∂t
)
− η(w2h2 − wc2hc2) = 0
∂L
∂e1
= f˜(θ1)(1− t)∂w1
∂e
h1 + tf(θ1)
∂w1
∂e1
h1(1 + )− f(θ1) + η
[
−(1− tF )hc2
∂wc2
∂e1
]
+ ζ
∂w1
∂e1
[
f˜1
(
(1− tPC)h1(e1, tPC)− (1− tDev)h1(e1, tDev)
)
+ f1
(
tPChi(e1, t
PC)− tDevh1(e1, tDev)
)
(1 + εh,w)
]
= 0
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∂L
∂e2
= f˜(θ2)(1− t)∂w2
∂e
h2 + tf(θ2)
∂w2
∂e2
h2(1 + )− f(θ2) + η(1− t)∂w2
∂e
h2
+ ζ
∂w2
∂e2
[
f˜2
(
(1− tPC)h2(e2, tPC)− (1− tDev)h2(e2, tDev)
)
+ f2
(
tPCh2(e2, t
PC)− tDevh1(e2, tDev)
)
(1 + εh,w)
]
= 0.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Dividing the FOC for T by 1 + ζ directly shows that the FOC is equivalent to the one
in Appendix A; the only difference is that η is now replaced by η
1+ζ
. The proof is then
equivalent to the proof in Appendix A.1
C.2 Proof of Proposition 6
The FOC for e1 and e2 are equivalent to those in Appendix A.2 apart from the additional
terms multiplied by ζ . The steps are, however, the same as in A.2 and the additional terms
multiplied with ζ then appear in the education subsidy formula as well.
These additional terms in the formula for the education subsidy read as:
ζ
∂wi
∂ei
[
f˜i
fi
(
(1− tPC)hi(ei, tPC)− (1− tDev)hi(ei, tDev)
)
+
(
tPChi(ei, t
PC)− tDevhi(ei, tDev)
)
(1 + εh,w)
]
. (14)
By assumption we have f˜(θ1)
f(θ1)
> 1 and f˜(θ2)
f(θ2)
< 1. In what follows we will write RFi for f˜ifi
to denote the relative Pareto weight and save on notation. We also simplify the notation
for h and write hi(ei, tDev) = hdevi and similarly for the other expressions. Then (14) can be
rearranged as:
ζ
∂wi
∂ei
((
hpci − hdevi
)− [tdevhdevi − tpchpci ] [1 + εh,wRFi − 1
])
. (15)
The sign of this term is equivalent to the sign of:
hpci − hdevi
tdevhdevi − tpchpci
−
[
1 + εh,w
RFi
− 1
]
(16)
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if h(t, w)t is increasing in t (which implies tdevhdevi − tpchpci > 0). The latter is the case if
εh,t > −1. Note that εh,t = − t1−tε. One can show that for the Laffer tax rate, we have
t
1−t =
1
ε
. As we are below the Laffer rate, we get εh,t > − εε = −1. Thus, h(t, w)t is
increasing in t in the cases we consider.
Since hi = (wi(1− t))ε, (16) is > (<)0 if:
(1− t)ε − (1− td)ε > (<)(1 + ε
RFi
− 1
)(
td
(
1− td)ε − t (1− t)ε)
which is >(<)0 whenever
H(t) ≡ (1− t)ε
(
1 + t
1 + ε
RFi
− t
)
> (<)
(
1− td)ε(1 + td1 + ε
RFi
− td
)
= H(td).
We now have to show that H(t) > H(td) for the low type and H(t) < H(td) for the high
type. We therefore take the derivative:
H ′(t) = −ε(1−t)ε−1
(
1 + t
1 + ε
RFi
− t
)
+(1− t)ε
(
1 + ε
RFi
− 1
)
= (1−t)ε
(
1 + ε
RFi
− 1− ε1 + t
1+ε
RFi
− t
1− t
)
.
We need to show that it is < 0 for the low type and > 0 for the high type, which is
equivalent to
(1− t)1 + ε
RFi
− (1− t)− ε
(
1 + t
1 + ε
RFi
− t
)
< (>)0
respectively, which is equivalent to
(1− t)(1 + ε)− (1− t)RFi −RFiε− t(1 + ε)ε+ tRFiε < (>)0
and therefore
(1− t)(1 + ε)− t(1 + ε)ε < (>)RFi ((1− t) + ε− tε)
which yields
RFi > (<)
(1− t)(1 + ε)− t(1 + ε)ε
(1− t)(ε+ 1) = 1−
t
1− tε.
As RF1 > 1, we directly see that this condition is always fullfilled for the θ1-type. Impor-
tantly, it is fulfilled for any t > 0 and therefore we know that H(td) < H(t) for the low
type.
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How about our result for the θ2-type? We need
RF2 <
(1− t)(1 + ε)− t(1 + ε)ε
(1− t)(ε+ 1) = 1−
t
1− tε
and
RF2 <
(1− t)(1 + ε)− t(1 + ε)ε
(1− t)(ε+ 1) = 1−
td
1− td ε.
If both of these inequalities are fulfilled we can be sure thatH(td) > H(t) for the high type.
Since td > t, the second is the stricter requirement. Inserting the formula for t
d
1−td yields:
f˜2
f2
< 1− (f2 − f˜2) y2 − y1
y¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A
.
This is equivalent to
f˜2(1− f2A) < f2(1− f2A).
Thus, whenever 1− f2A > 0, we have our result. Term A can be written as
A =
w1+ε2 (1− t)ε − w1+ε1 (1− t)ε
f1w
1+ε
1 (1− t)ε + f2w1+ε2 (1− t)ε
=
w1+ε2 − w1+ε1
f1w
1+ε
1 + f2w
1+ε
2
.
f2A < 1 therefore implies
f2w
1+ε
2 − f2w1+ε1 < f1w1+ε1 + f2w1+ε2
and hence
−f2w1+ε1 < f1w1+ε1
which is always fulfilled.
C.3 List of Countries in the Empirical Part
Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ja-
maica, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Uganda.
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